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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property 
uamage arising out of an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The case was tried withont a jnry, after a demand 
for jury trial was denied, as more completely set forth 
in Statement of Facts. During the trial, Plaintiff Jam es 
D. Christensen was permitted to add a claim for his 
lJersonal injuries, in addition to his claim for property 
damage. The Conrt granted Judgment for the Plaintiffs. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For reasons appearing in thi:::; recital, we are sepa-
rating the facts into two categories. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
This suit arose out of an automobile accident wherein 
Defendant drove hi:::; car into the rear of the Plaintiffs' 
vehicle. Liability was clear, and we need not go into 
more detail. 
Mr. Christensen sued for property damage only. 
Mrs. Christensen sued for personal injuries. The suit 
was filed on September 4, 1968 (R-1). Atto111ey Wilde 
filed an appearance for the Defendant on October 1, 
1968 (R-4). 
On October 14, 1968, a Stipulation was filed, signed 
by the attorneys of record, and the Defendant, that the 
Defendant was uninsured - a peculiar stipulation in a 
tort action. On November 25th, a Withdrawal of Counsel 
was signed by the Defendant's Attorney, and signed a:::; 
received by the Defendant. On the same date, November 
25th, a Notice of Readiness for Trial was filed in the 
Clerk's office. No mailing certificate is attached indi-
cating any notice was given to the Defendant, but indicat-
ing that notice was sent to the withdrawn attorney. 
Nothing appears that the Defendant himself was ever 
notified, as required by 78-51-36, U.C.A. A doctor's re-
port was attached to the Notice of Readiness for Trial 
concerning only the injuries of Mrs. Christensen. 
On June 19, 1968, five days before the scheduled 
trial, an Appearance wa:::; filed by Defendant's present 
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Attorney, and simultaneously therewith, a Demand for 
Jury Trial on the date scheduled, or in the alternative, 
a Motion for continuance to a later date with a jury trial. 
By special agreement between counsel, a hearing was 
11eld before the Honorable Bryant Croft, Judge on June 
20, 1969. The Court took the matter under advisement, 
and requested Plaintiffs' Attorney to file an Affidavit, 
and the Affidavit was immediately filed. 
(See Stipulation for addition to record on appeal.) 
Plaintiffs' Attorney filed an Affidavit (R-13) dated 
June 20th which concerned itself only with the actions 
of the Insurance Company for Plaintiffs, and its repre-
sentatives, which affidavit was in opposition to the Mo-
tion for a Jury Trial. Not one allegation was made 
concerning the actions or omissions of the Defendant 
himself. Based upon the Affidavit, the Lower Court 
denied the Motion for a Jury Trial. 
Trial, accordingly, proceeded without a jury. Dur-
ing the trial, Plaintiffs' Attorney moved to amend the 
Complaint in behalf of Mr. Christensen, to include a 
claim, for the first time, to a personal injury action, 
·which ·was granted, over the objections of Defendant 
(R-17). 
Judgment was rendered for Plaintiffs as follows: 
Betty Christensen-Special Damages ----------$ 998.29 
General Damages __________ 5,000.00 
James D. Christensen-Special Damages ______ $232.50 
General Damages ______ 750.00 
Auto Damages __________ 393.64 
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IMMATERIAL FACTS 
The following facts influenced the Lower Court in 
its decisions against the Defendant. 
The Plaintiffs were insured under a Liability Policy 
containing an Uninsured Motorist Provision. This cov-
erage agrees to pay to the Plaintiffs the amount which 
they are legally entitled to recover from an uninsured 
motorist. The policy affords absolutely no insurance to 
the uninsured motorist. However, the uninsured motorist, 
(in this case Mr. Cordova), and the Company have a 
common interest - i.e. that the damages awarded be 
reasonable for the injuries sustained. 
As recited in the Affidavit of Plaintiff's Attorney, 
negotiations for settlement between Plaintiffs' Attorneys 
and the insurance company, Reserve Insurance Company, 
did not result in a settlement. No notice was given to the 
Defendant personally of any of the negotiations, or of 
the progress of the suit. No notice was ever given him 
to secure counsel, or of the impending trial. 
Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs and the Insurance Com-
pany could not agree on a settlement, and because of the 
imminence of the trial date, Plaintiffs and the Insurance 
Company were faced with the following: 
1. That Plaintiffs were insistent on proceeding 
with the trial, which of course, would have 
been a default proceeding. 
2. The insurance company, by the terms of the 
policy, would not recognize or be bound by a 
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Default Judgment, inasmuch as the1 language 
of the policy specifically provided: 
"No judgment againt any person or organ-
jzation alleged to be legally responsible for 
the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as 
between the insured and the company, of 
the issues of liability of such person o,r 
organization or of the amount of damages 
to which the insured is legally entitled; 
unless such judgment is entered pursuant 
to an action prosecuted by the insured with 
the written consent of the company." (See 
Stipulation for Addition to Record on 
Appeal.) 
3. Following the default judgment (had it been 
secured by Plaintiffs) a separate suit would 
necessarily be required to test the validity of 
the judgment, and the defenses under the pol-
icy, and the foregoing provision of the policy. 
To avoid a multiplicity of suits, and to establish the 
legal liability of the uninsured motorist, the Company, 
in effect, agreed to a jury trial for that purpose, and to 
pay the attorney's fees involved. The Defendant, Mr. 
Cordova, was fully advised of the above, and consented 
to the arrangement. NO INSURANCE COVERAGE 
vV AS PROVIDED HIM, and it was understood in writ-
ing that if the Plaintiffs were paid the amount of the 
judgment, the judgment would not be satisfied. Further, 
the Company reserved the right given by the policy, 
to take legal action in the name of the insured to recover 
said amount from the Defendant. However, again, the 
Defendant and the Company did not have a conflict in 
their mutual desire to establish the damages as reason-
ably as possible. 
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For the above reasons, L. E. Midgley, witl1 Defend-
ant's permission, appeared as Attorney for the Defendant 
and demanded a jury trial on the same date as the 
appearance was filed. The Plaintiffs' Attorneys success-
fully resisted the motion for a jury trial, and over De-
fendant's objections a non-jury trial was held. 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENY-
ING DEFENDA1\TT A JURY TRIAL. 
We fully appreciate the pronouncements of this 
Court to the effect that where a demand for jury trial is 
not timely made, it is in the sound discretion of the Trial 
Court as to whether a belated demand for jury trial 
will be granted. 
Thomz;son vs. Anderson, 107 Ut. 331, 153 P2d 665. 
Hunter vs. Michaelis, 114 Ut. 242, 198 P2d 245. 
Webb vs. Webb, 116 Ut. 115, 209 P2d 201. 
Farmers and Merchants Bank vs. Universal C.I.T., 
4 Ut.2d 155, 289 P2d 1045. 
James Mamtfacturing Company i·s. Wilson, 15 
Ut.2d 210, 390 P2d 127. 
Sweeney vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Ut.2d 113, 417 
P2d 126. 
The true test, we submit, for the Court to consider 
in granting or denying a belated demand for jury trial, 
is whether excusable neglect on the part of the party 
demanding the jury, is shown. 
In Thompson vs. Anderson, Supra, this Honorable 
Court stated: 
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"Nor is it an abm;e of discretion to fail to 
grant a demand for a jury trial when made late, 
if no excitse is shown for failure to make a demand 
within the time allowed by statute." (Emphasis 
ours) 
In Farmers cmd Merchants B(J;nk vs. Universal 
C.I.T., Supra. this Court again stated: 
"Where, as here, no valid excuse for the fail-
ure to make the demand timely was offered, there 
is no abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial 
Court in denying a later demand." 
In the instant case, the Defendant was without coun-
on the very day a Certificate of Readiness for Trial 
was filed, and even that Notice was not served on the 
Defendant personally. He was never notified to secure 
counsel. Many months later, the clerk, over the signature 
of the Presiding Judge, forwarded a Notice of the trial 
date to the Plaintiffs' Attorneys and to the attorney who 
had long since withdrawn. That Notice (R-10) in the 
last paragraph states: 
"This matter is set for a non-jury trial, unleS's 
the jury fee has been paid heretofore. If a jury 
trial is desired, the statutory fee must be paid no 
later than 10 days from the date of this letter, 
with notice thereof being served on opposing 
counsel." 
NO NOTICE OF TRIAL DATE WAS GIVEN 
THE DEFENDANT AND A COPY OF THE FORE-
GOING LETTER WAS NOT FORWARDED TO HIM. 
vVhen Defendant's present Attorney filed his Ap-
pearance, only six days before the scheduled trial, the 
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Defendant had been without representation by an Attor-
ney for ahnost nine months, during which time, unknown 
to him, there was a fight going on in the bleachers 
' involving an insurance company he probably didn't know 
existed. 
vVhen his present Attorney moved for a jury trial 
immediately upon his filing the appearance, and upon 
argument of the Motion, the Honorable Judge Croft 
requested an Affidavit of the Plaintiffs' Attorneys con-
cerning the fight in the bleachers, BUT NO TIME vV AS 
GIVEN THE DEFENDANT PERSONALLY to file 
a counter affidavit, for the simple reason that no time 
was left before the trial date. 
Never in the spotty career of the writer, have we 
seen first hand such a complete lack of interest of all 
parties, including the Court, of the rights of a litigant. 
Never have we seen an Affidavit covering absolutely 
immaterial actions of a non-litigant used so effectively 
in prejudicing the rights of a litigant. 
In this case, we are concerned with the Defendant, 
Mr. Cordova, and not with Reserve Insurance Company, 
who had the unmitigated gall to disagree with Plaintiffs' 
Attorneys on the value of Plaintiffs' claim against the 
Defendant. 
POINT TWO 
THE DEFENDANT, BY RECEIPTING HIS ATTOR-
NEY'S NOTICE OF WIT HD RAW AL, IS DEEMED 
TO BE APPEARING PRO SE, AND FAIL URE TO 
GIVE HIM NOTICE OF ALL SUBSEQUENT PRO-
CEEDINGS WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
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Article I, Sec. 11, Utah Constitution provides: 
" ... and no person shall be barred from prose-
cuting or def ending before any tribunal in the 
8tate, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party." 
78-51-36, Utah Code Annotated States: 
I ''NOTICE TO APPOINT SUCCESSOR -
\ \Vhen an Attorney dies, or is removed or sus-
) pended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an 
) action or proceeding for whom he was acting as 
/ Attorney must before any further proceedings 
/ are had against him, be required by the adverse 
\ party, by written notice, to appoint another attor-
. ney or to appear in verson." (Emphasis added) 
\Ve are well aware of this Court's decision in Secur-
ity Adju.stmeut Burewu, J.nc. vs. West, 20 Ut. 2nd 292, 
437 P2d 214, and we agree with Mr. Justice Henriod's 
comment in footnote 4 to the effect that the rule is sub-
ject to "some legitimate criticism and analysis." 
The ''analysis," not considered in the above case, is 
clear. When a Defendant "appears" by counsel, the later 
withdrawal by his Attorney does not, and cannot alter 
the fact that the Defendant has still "appeared" in the 
law suit. His Answer to the Complaint denying the 
Plaintiffs' allegations is not affected, and remains as 
a general denial. By simple subtraction, therefore, when 
his Attorney withdraws, the Defendant's "appearance" 
if: without counsel, or pro se. 
The fact that the Defendant is not schooled in the 
niceties of pleading and practice is of no concern. He 
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has a constitutional right to be notified of all sub::;ey_uent 
developments. If he receives notice of each step in the 
litigation, and takes no action, he is properly bound by 
the ultimate conclusion of the case. 
But if it be the decision of the Security Adjustment 
case that it is justice and fair play to completely ignore 
the rights of a litigant even though his Attorney has 
withdrawn (when his rights should be more closely scru-
tinized) the facts in the case at bar are clearly distin-
guishable. 
The Notice of Withdrawal of Defendant's Attorney 
was signed as received by the Defendant personally. By 
that action, he not only acknowledged but consented to 
the withdrawal. He also effectively "appeared" individu-
ally. Notice of this was given to Plaintiffs' counsel. 
The form of his appearance is inunaterial. The law 
is interested in justice, not forms. For example, a long 
hand note written by a Defendant to the Clerk of thf' 
Court, or the Court, in answer to a Swnmons and Com-
plaint served on him, is universally accepted as an effec-
tive Answer, even though it does not in any way comply 
with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Certainly, in that analagous situation, all further 
notices and proceedings must be given to the Defendant, 
whether or not there is a further requirement that he be 
notified to secure counsel. 
"\Ve further submit that there is a long standing 
custom and practice of the District Courts, and particn-
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larly the Third District, that when an Attorney with-
draws, the other party must give notice to the unrepre-
sented party to secure counsel. If he does not, notices 
are mailed to him personally. 
After his Attorney withdrew, the Defendant was 
completely ignored by Plaintiffs' Attorneys and the Clerk 
of the Court. The Honorable Presiding Judge sanctioned 
those actions denying this Defendant the right to repre-
sent himself, if he so chose. 
The Defendant, therefore, is entitled to a new trial. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED 
PLAINTIFF JAMES D. CHRISTENSEN TO ADD A 
CLAIM OF PERSONAL INJURIES DURING THE 
TRIAL. 
Again we are discussing the interests of the Defend-
ant, l\fr. Cordova, and not Reserve Insurance Company, 
Plaintiffs' insurer. There is no question that Reserve 
was aware of the claim for injuries by Mr. Christensen, 
which were advanced after the law suit was started. 
But the Defendant, personally, was completely unaware 
of such a claim. While he was originally represented by 
Attorney \Vilde, no claim for injuries was advanced 
either in the Complaint, or otherwise. No Notice was 
given him of such a claim until during the progress of 
the trial. During the trial, the amendment was objected 
to by Defendant, through his Attorney, but the Honor-
able Trial Judge permitted the amendment and Judgment 
was awarded for injuries which Defendant had never 
known existed. 
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Rule 15 (a) AMENDMENTS, U.R.C.P. 
"A part:· ma:· amend his ph1ading once as a 
matter of co1irse at any fon<:> lwfore a responsive 
pleading is servt>d or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is iwnnitted and the 
action has not been placed upon tlw trial calendar, 
he may so amend it at any time within 20 
after it is served. Other1,·ise a party may amend 
his pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires. A party 
shall plead in respon::;e to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the 
original pleading or within 10 days after service 
of the amended pleading, whichever period may be 
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders." 
Rule 15 (b) AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO 
THE EVIDENCE, U.R.C.P. 
"vVhen issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties. 
they shall be treated in all respects as if thl'y 
had been raised in the pleadings. Such anwnd-
ment of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidt>nce and to 
raise these issues may be mad<· upon motion of 
any party at any time, evt>n after judgment; hut 
failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. If Pvidence is objected to 
at the trial on the grounds that it is not within 
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to he amendPd wlwn the pres-
entation of the nwrits of the action will be sub-
sPrved tlwreby and the objt>cting party faib to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such <'Vi-
denc1c·· would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. 1'he court 
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shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable 
the objecting party to meet such evidence." 
In Iljorth vs. Whittenberg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P2d 
907 held that the test of whether the Amendment should 
be granted, was whether the amendment imported a new 
and different cause of action. 
Certainly the addition of a new claim for personal 
injuries while the trial is in progress, injects a new and 
different cause of action, the merits of which create new 
and different defenses than to a claim solely for property 
damage. 
True, Plaintiffs' insurer had been advised of the 
claim, as was Defendant's present Attorney. But by the 
same token, so were Plaintiffs' Attorneys, who failed to 
move for an amendment, as required by the Rules. The 
Def end ant had no knowledge of such a claim, and his 
rights are at issue here. 
The allowance of the amendment, therefore, was 
prejudicially erroneous. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. MIDGLEY 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
702 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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